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Abstract 
Gibson developed the affordance concept to complement his theory of direct percep-
tion that stands in sharp contrast with the prevalent inferential theories of percep-
tion. A comparison of the two approaches shows that the distinction between them 
also has an ontological aspect. We trace the history and newer formalizations of the 
notion of affordance and discuss some competing opinions on its scope. Next, empiri-
cal work on the affordance concept is reviewed in brief and the relevance of dynami-
cal systems theory to affordance research is demonstrated. Finally, the striking but 
often neglected convergence of the ideas of Gibson and those of certain Continental 
philosophers is discussed. 
Keywords:  affordance;  Gibson;  perception-action;  dynamical  systems  theory;  phe-
nomenology. 
 
 
An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to under-
stand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is 
both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the environ-
ment and to the observer. 
(Gibson 1979: 129) 
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At the end of the 1970's, the American psychologist James J. Gibson introduced the 
concept 'affordance'. It was meant to help complete the ecological theory of direct per-
ception, of which he was the main proponent. On the one hand, affordances are a very 
easy thing to explain; they are the possibilities for action that an environment allows 
to an animal. On the other hand, the affordance concept can become obscure when 
one tries to exactly define it along with the notion of direct perception. 
On the following pages, we explain the concept in detail. In particular, we introduce it 
in the historical context in which it appeared. Then, subsequent attempts for formali-
zation and extension of the concept are discussed, followed by an empirical review 
and a discussion of comparable notions in the work of other scholars. 
 
Preliminaries: two-term and three-term theories of perception 
Perception has long been a central topic of study in philosophy, psychology and more 
recently  in  neuroscience―perhaps  because  an  understanding  of  perception  would 
answer not only the question of how one gets about in one's daily life, but also how 
the attainment of knowledge is even possible. The central assumption underlying the 
theoretical framework of the received view follows from the work of Herman von 
Helmholtz (1878/1971) but can be traced further back to Plato's ideas (see the last sec-
tions for more on the relation between Gibson and the philosophy of perception). The 
assumption is that perception is a three-term relation among a subject, an object, and 
something internal to the subject that stands in for the object (e.g., a representation). 
For example, one can construe visual perception such that the projected images on the 
retina play the role of that third term, and introduce a process of unconscious infe-
rence that disambiguates the images on the basis of previously acquired knowledge. 
This is necessary because the images on the retina are only deformed projections of 
the perceived object. 
Gibson disagreed strongly with such a conception of perception. In his early work, he 
strove  to  show  the  weaknesses  in  three-term  explanations.  For  example,  how  can 
knowledge from previous experience inform the current situation without the per-
ceiver already having knowledge about the current situation? And why does one need 
to presuppose that vision is based on static images on the retina? The retina always 
moves (between saccades too), presumably in order to sample the optic array in its 
transformation. For that matter, static stimulation is not even defined. When the im-
age on the retina is immobilized with a special apparatus, the study participants can-
not even tell whether light is present or not. Hence, the eye is better conceived of as a 
3D apparatus (two-space plus time) of the visual system, not a 2D camera. The motiva-
tion behind the snapshot (2D) model that requires a three-term theory of vision is 
problematic. For such reasons Gibson rejected the view that animals perceive indi-
rectly objects in their environments by way of perceptual mediators such as retinal 
images that refer to these objects. He posited that perception is direct, that is, it is a 
two-term relation between animal and environment. A Remedy called Affordance 
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Origin 
Gibson realized that if the notion of indirect perception is abandoned, the traditional 
ontology of perception needs to be altered too. Therefore, in addition to his first claim, 
that perception is a two-term and not a three-tern relation between animal and envi-
ronmental properties, he proposed that perception is not of Lockean qualities such as 
the length of an object expressed as the Euclidean distance between points but of pos-
sibilities for action. Note that in traversing a gap, length itself does not qualify as a 
possibility for action but 'shorter than my step' does. 
It is generally accepted that Gibson's two claims necessarily imply each other (but see 
Vicente 2003). Suppose that only the first claim is true. If only things such as surfaces 
were perceived directly – Gibson’s early work focuses on the perception of surfaces 
(Mace 2005) – then the possibilities for action that these surfaces afford would have to 
be inferred. Because the main function of perception is to enable action, it would fol-
low that most perception is indirect.  
Supposing that only the second claim is true turns the affordance concept into a mere 
buzzword.  One  can  study  possibilities  for  action  as  conceptual  possibilities  in  the 
framework of the received view (e.g., designing algorithms that infer gap length from 
distance cues and compare it to an internal representation of maximum step length). 
One can call the product of such an algorithm affordance perception, but this would 
not make any difference to the computational theory. In other words, the affordance 
concept has a special meaning and hence, is necessary, only in the context of Gibso-
nian theory. 
What was Gibson’s original exposition? In contrast with the ontology of the received 
view, e.g., “[o]rthodox psychology asserts that we perceive these objects insofar as we 
discriminate their properties or qualities”, Gibson (1979: 134) proposed “… that what 
we perceive when we look at objects are their affordances, not their qualities”. What 
are affordances? “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, 
what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. I mean by it something that refers 
to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does” (Gibson 
1979: 127). 
What is it about the environment that allows affordances to be perceived? “Perhaps 
the composition and layout of surfaces constitute what they afford. If so, to perceive 
them is to perceive what they afford” (Gibson 1979: 127). In order to understand what 
this layout might be, it is useful to refer to his earlier insights about the occluding edge, 
which follow a similar logic (Mace 2005). As I move my head leftwards, an edge (the 
right side of the computer screen) progressively erases a portion of the visual array 
(the wall that serves as background). This is enough to show in a definite way that the 
screen is between me and the wall. It is crucial to realize that the occluding edge does 
not only define the locations of surface A (here) and surface B (there) but also their 
spatial order relative to me, the point of observation. Later in his career, Gibson rea-
lized that the occluding edge provides even more information – it specifies to a per-AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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ceiver that she can reach the one surface directly and needs to make a detour to reach 
the other. In short, things such as occluding edges can specify not only spatial order 
but also affordances (e.g., reachability). 
 
Effectivities complement affordances 
Gibson put enormous effort into understanding what it is about the environment that 
allows one to directly perceive it. Consequently, his work says much more about the 
environment,  especially  the  visual  environment,  than  about  the  animal.  The  term 
effectivity was introduced in order to help compensate for this inequality (Michaels & 
Carello 1981; Shaw et al. 1982). The animal's effectivities are directed to the environ-
ment in the way that the environment's affordances are directed to the animal. An 
affordance  dispositional  and  an  effectivity  dispositional;  the  concepts  complement 
each other and, thus, make a dual. 
This move has attracted some criticism because one could possibly understand it as a 
step backwards. Gibson's affordance “points both ways, to the environment and to the 
observer” (Gibson 1979: 129, italics added); there is no need for two terms. In the “re-
formulation”,  however,  affordance  and  effectivity  point  unidirectionally  (Cutting 
1982: 212). Accordingly, one abandons what is most important and original about af-
fordances by dispensing with the double arrow in their formalization. 
The  apparent  discrepancy  between  Gibson  and  Shaw-Turvey-Mace  stems  from  the 
different ways in which the word affordance is used in the two formalisms. What Gib-
son calls an affordance is what Shaw-Turvey-Mace call an affordance-effectivity dual. 
Gibson's double-sided arrow is replaced with something like a field with two poles. In 
order  to  see  how  the  two  formulations  are  similar,  consider  that  instead  of  an 
'affordance-effectivity dual' one could say 'environment pole and animal pole of the 
affordance dual.' The latter version fits more literally with Gibson's expression and 
would not change the Shaw-Turvey-Mace formalism. Furthermore, dispositions nec-
essarily come in complementary pairs. Hence, the relational character of affordances 
that Gibson was aiming for is also part of the definition (Turvey et al. 1981; Turvey 
1992). Michaels (2003) provides an evaluation of the gains and losses related to the 
notion of effectivities. Shaw and colleagues (1988, 2001) aim to develop a systematic 
theory of effectivities. 
 
Formalism and ontology 
Gibson's second claim, that perception of affordances is understood as real and not as 
conceptual possibilities for action, implies that affordances are an ontological, not an 
epistemological category (Shaw et al. 1982; Turvey et al. 1981; Turvey 1992). Addition-
ally, affordances exist as properties of the environment independently of the perceiv-
er. As long as squirrels exist, a particular tree affords climbing to a squirrel regardless 
of whether there is a squirrel around. Hence, affordances are prior in logic to their 
actualization. One way to summarize a lot of what has been said so far is through the A Remedy called Affordance 
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definition “A situation X affords action Y to an animal Z on occasion O if certain rele-
vant compatibilities between X and Z obtain” and, analogously, “An animal Z can effect 
action Y on an environmental situation or event X if certain relevant compatibilities 
between X and Z obtain” (Shaw et al. 1982: 196-197). 
What are these compatibilities? In any particular situation, what is dynamic and what 
a psychologist would focus on is not every potential affordance and effectivity, but the 
match of particular affordances and effectivities that got actualized by the experimen-
tal situation. Turvey (1992) accommodates this fact by explicitly assigning a role to the 
environmental properties and animal dispositions supporting an affordance. An ani-
mal Z with the disposition to perform an action q (same as Y above) and an environ-
ment/situation X with a property p that complements the disposition q form an envi-
ronment-agent system Wpq  = j(Xp,Zq). The dispositionals p and q actualize each other 
once being made available to each other, what Turvey calls the juxtaposition function 
j. In this manner they select each other out from the larger arrays that contain all po-
tential properties and actions of the particular environment and agent, respectively. 
Kadar and Effken (1994) develop an approach to the ontology of affordances and effec-
tivities that is more of a critique of Turvey’s formalism (1992) than a self-sufficient 
proposal. Specifically, they would like to replace the metaphysics that Turvey’s work 
relies on with Heidegger's. Turvey is led to build his ontology out of things with prop-
erties. Conversely, adopting Heidegger’s metaphysics, the authors argue, would lead to 
assigning ontological primacy to fields.  The question is, which of the two metaphysics 
fits better with Gibson's understanding of affordance? Kadar and Effken argue that, 
first, Heidegger and Gibson thought the same way about many issues (see the section 
Relations between Gibson and some philosophers of perception) and, second, fields 
can be made consistent with both Gibson and Heidegger, but things cannot. 
 
Recent developments 
In contrast to some of the earlier formalizations (Turvey 1992; Michaels 2003) and 
somewhat  comparable  to  Kadar  and  Effken  (1994),  Chemero  (2003,  2009)  argues 
against understanding affordance as a property of the environment. Instead, it is a 
relation between an animal’s ability to act and aspects of the environment. For in-
stance,  the affordance  “stair-climbability” is  the relation  between  riser  height and 
climbing ability of the observer, and is not in the layout of the surfaces alone. This 
move, Chemero argues, solves the philosophical problems associated with properties 
and dispositionals while keeping Gibson’s approach intact (2003, 2009). The situation 
is  similar  to  the  explication  made  earlier  of how  both  Gibson’s  and  Shaw-Turvey-
Mace’s accounts fit the same abstract theoretical model. 
Regardless of whether affordances are understood as duals, dispositional properties, 
or relations, all the formalizations listed so far treat affordances in a timeless domain. 
The field of ecological psychology, however, is heavily influenced by the advent of dy-
namical systems theory. Chemero (2009) therefore argues that the coupling between AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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affordance  and  ability  (effectivity)  should  be  treated  not  only  as  an  instantaneous 
match (lock and key) but as an unfolding system that in the longer time domain con-
verges with niche construction. 
Chemero's (2003, 2009) real break with traditional Gibsonian theory is with respect to 
the issue of specificity of information. Usually, one takes it that perception can only be 
direct if information exists that specifies what is possible; otherwise ambiguity exists, 
and a process of inference is necessary. However, building on the work of Barwise and 
Perry (1981) and Milikan (2000), Chemero argues that information need not be specific 
as long as there is a constraint that connects (non-specifying) information with what is 
present in the environment in a way that is reliable enough to guide behavior (see 
also, Withagen & Chemero 2009, 2011). For instance, to a prey animal the shadow of a 
flying predator informs it about the presence of a predator, but the constraint between 
the predator and the shadow is merely correlational. On a cloudy day, the flying pre-
dator  will  not  produce a shadow moving  across the  ground.  And  if  the  shadow  is 
present, the possibility exists that it was produced by a non-predatory animal or a 
flying object of a similar shape (example taken from Millikan 2000). This position thus 
explicitly addresses perceptual error (see Gibson 1979: 142-143 on misinformation for 
affordances).  It  also  fits  well  with  empirical  findings  of  perceivers’  use  of  non-
specifying information, such as those by Michaels and de Vries (1998). For a critique 
and extension of Chemero (2009) see Withagen and van der Kamp (2010). 
 
The scope of the concept 
Turvey (1992) abides by Hume's touchstone; action-based affordances at a level that 
applies to all animals are to be taken as “propaedeutic to any extension of affordances 
to other domains” (Turvey 1992: 174). Conversely, Shotter (1982) emphasizes the his-
torical  character  of  affordances.  In  a  human  world  one  must  consider  the  socio-
cultural affordances. For Gibson, mailboxes afford sending letters to a human encul-
tured in letter-writing in the same way that chairs afford sitting. Stoffregen (2004) also 
argues for a broader scope of affordances. This is appropriate in the context of his un-
derstanding of affordance as emergent properties of the animal-environment system. 
Heft (2001) attributes affordances to the intrinsic properties of features, objects and 
events that tie us together in relations. Therefore, values and motivations that are in-
trinsic to affordances also constitute a proper domain of study. 
Equating affordances with just anything that is “meaningful” might trivialize them 
(Michaels 2003). Still, Gibson's theory of perception was meant to address the human 
world in its full complexity. For instance, the mailbox example refers to a network of 
human activities. A full-fledged theory of affordance should be able to take heed of the 
richness within any action. How to balance these requirements? Maybe affordances 
can be organized by taking into account the different capacities of different organisms 
since these, taken as effectivities, actualize an affordance. 
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Classical experiments 
Eleanor Gibson must be the pioneer of affordance research with her work on child 
development, which even preceded the formal introduction of the concept (in: Adolph 
&  Berger  2006).  Her  visual  cliff  paradigm  shows  that  human  babies  and  self-
locomoting animals perceive that the cliff affords falling and injury, whereas the non-
self-locomoting ones do not until they learn to locomote. A methodologically more 
optimal design, however, consists of an adjustable locomotory slope. Instead of a cliff 
one uses a declining surface and as a result there is no need for a glass plate that may 
or may not be as transparent as the experimenter would like (Adolph & Berger, 2006). 
A  novel  finding  there  is  the  motor-specificity  of  learning.  After  having  learned  to 
perceive which slopes afford crawling and which do not, infants fail at the task once 
they start walking and, hence, have to go through the learning process again. 
Warren (1984) was among the first to test the animal-relative character of affordances. 
He examined participants' perceived ability to step on the flight of a stairway. In par-
ticular, the transition from ability to inability was measured as a function of riser 
height. Participants from both the “short” and “tall” groups transitioned when the 
ratio of riser height to individual leg length had reached a value that was the same 
across groups. Such ratios are known as dimensionless π-numbers (the units cancel 
out because they are the same in both the numerator and denominator) and can also 
index critical transitions in certain purely physical systems. For instance, the Rayleigh 
number for a given fluid predicts heat transfer transitions from conduction to convec-
tion (as in the onset of boiling). 
The hypothesis that body-scaled information specifies affordances was tested further 
using judgments of the passability of a vertical aperture (Warren & Wang 1987). The 
layout of an Ames-like room was manipulated in a way that demonstrated that partic-
ipants relied on body-scaled (eye height) information and not on extrinsic cues of ob-
ject size and distance. Similarly, a study of sitting and stair-climbing found that an 
eye-height-based π-number specifies the affordance boundaries (Mark 1987). Interes-
tingly, participants adjust to the eye-height changes induced by platform shoes only if 
allowed natural posture and mobility patterns during the learning phase (Mark et al. 
1990). 
 
Some recent studies 
Empirical π-numbers for affordance boundaries such as those found in the stepping 
and sitting studies need theoretical justification. Otherwise, one could speculate that a 
higher-order homunculus  is monitoring  the  use of  information  and flipping  on-off 
switches in accord with memorized threshold values. Self-organizing systems theory 
naturally handles these transitions, formally called phase transitions. Nonlinear dy-
namical modeling extends the previously merely conceptual use of this theory by giv-
ing an explicit mathematical account of affordance transitions (Fitzpatrick et al. 1994; 
Frank et al., 2009; Lopresti-Goodman et al. 2011; Richardson et al. 2007). AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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The intrinsic metric for affordances may include variables such as effort. Participants 
tend to overestimate the slant of a perceived slope when their response is verbal or 
pictorial but are relatively accurate when the response is in the form of a coordination 
task (Proffitt et al. 1995). Importantly, the overestimation is amplified after exercise 
implying that participants are not merely perceiving slant but a surface to be climbed. 
A similar paradigm has shown that the effect of prospective effort appears if the par-
ticipants actually intend to perform the action corresponding to the distance being 
estimated (Witt et al. 2004; but see Woods et al. 2009). 
Generalizing the intrinsic metric even further, one can simply use abilities as the scal-
ing factor (Chemero 2003). Fajen studies abilities in the context of visually guided ac-
tions (Fajen 2005; Bastin et al. 2011). For instance, braking behavior while driving de-
pends on the car’s maximum deceleration (Fajen 2005) and subjects turn toward a 
target when the ideal speed required to intercept it is less than maximum possible 
speed, and ahead of it when ideal speed is greater than maximum (Bastin et al. 2011). 
Thus, observers adjust such that the intended action is always possible within the lim-
its of their action ability. 
 
Relations between Gibson and some philosophers of perception  
Ever  since  the  classical  Greek  period,  most  philosophers  and,  later,  psychologists 
would assume as a starting point in their studies of knowledge and perception what 
appears to be an obvious truth―here I am, a subject, looking at something over there, 
an object. How does a subject get to know a detached object? This question has been 
formalized as Cartesian skepticism. Asking this question leads to a representational 
account of knowledge and perception. In contrast, some of the most important 20th 
century philosophers (e.g., Carnap, Wittgenstein, Dewey, Davidson, Heidegger) argued 
against even considering the skepticism problem and instead sought to “dissolve” it 
(Blattner 2006: 109). Heidegger's particular strategy is illuminating; scholars need to 
stop relying on bare intuition to formalize their foundational problem and start using 
a systematic phenomenological analysis. The conclusion of his analysis is that the sub-
ject-object dichotomy only appears in what is called the present-at-hand mode. This 
mode exists only in isolated cases of experience that do not warrant the presumed 
fundamental character of the dichotomy. 
The similarity between Gibson and Martin Heidegger and Maurice-Merleau-Ponty has 
been pointed out a number of times (Dreyfus 1996; Heft 2001; Kadar & Effken 1994). 
Compare their ways of bridging the subject-object divide: “An affordance is neither an 
objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like.” (Gibson 1979: 
129) and “Perceivedness … is in a certain way objective, in a certain way subjective, yet 
neither of the two” (Heidegger 1982: 314). 
What other commonalities can one obtain? First, the Heideggerian word for affor-
dances could be equipment (Kadar & Effken 1994), but ready-to-hand is a possibility 
too.  The  latter  stands for  the  function,  the  for-what,  that a  tool  promises  (Dreyfus 
2007).  Consequently,  an  affordance  structure  that  defines  a  niche  (Chemero  2009) 
would correspond to Heidegger's functional totality, the structure of towards-which or A Remedy called Affordance 
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in-order-to  relations (Blattner  2006:  59).  Second, Heidegger (Dreyfus  1991)  just  like 
Gibson assigned his respective construct the status of ontological primacy, more fun-
damental than Lockean properties which themselves have a derived character. Third, 
for  both  scholars  possibilities  for  action  cannot  be  cast  in  terms  of  propositional 
knowledge characterized by truth conditions (Blattner 2006: 94; Turvey 1992: 176). 
Finally, both the concepts of equipment/ready-to-hand and affordances are fundamen-
tally temporal. Dasein is historical and the kind of being that projects itself ahead of 
itself (Dreyfus 1991: 186), it is always “pressing forward into possibilities.” And on Gib-
son's side, affordances are prospective by nature (Turvey 1992). 
Gibson’s own abandonment of the subject-object assumption is probably most directly 
influenced by the American pragmatism tradition of William James and John Dewey 
of which he was part through his advisor Edwin Holt, who was a student of James. See 
Dewey's famous critique of the reflex arc concept for an entry point in the pragmatist 
tradition, and Heft (2001) for a detailed exposition of this lineage. 
Who else can be found in Gibson's anti-representationalist camp? According to Lom-
bardo, Aristotle anticipates Gibson in opposing the mind-matter dualism of his mentor 
Plato and in arguing that the world itself and not the world of appearances is the ob-
ject of perception. Additionally, Aristotle’s “correlative objects” are similar to Gibson’s 
notion of affordances as perceived opportunities for action in the environment (Lom-
bardo 1987).  
The umwelten, the perceiver-centered animal-relative worlds of von Uexküll (1957), 
also converge with Gibson's thinking––more specifically with the way an affordance-
structure defines an animal's niche (Chemero 2009). We do not know if Gibson was 
familiar with von Uexküll's work but both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger read von 
Uexküll, and Gibson was familiar with Merleau-Ponty (Heft 2001: 161). There are sev-
eral other theorists whose ideas were closely related to Gibson’s affordance concept 
but who were representationalists. These include Egon Brunswik and the Gestalt psy-
chologists. 
 
Conclusion 
What are some of the underlying themes in the sections presented above? Ecological 
psychology carefully examines the assumptions that sit behind research in percep-
tion-action. It has exposed fundamental problems with the subject-object dichotomy 
that is taken for granted by the received view. Affordance research is not just about 
how knowledge is acquired but about what there is to be known to begin with. It is 
thus applied research as much as it is theoretical. It is an active field, both in terms of 
theoretical development and in terms of the amount of empirical work that is being 
done. It has also become extremely interdisciplinary. Just in this short review we have 
touched  upon  experimental  psychology,  physics,  dynamical  systems  theory,  self-
organization, and stuck phenomenology in between. 
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What are some of the outstanding challenges that affordance research faces? The con-
cept was developed in the context of an ongoing dispute between the ecological and 
cognitivist traditions within psychology. Nowadays, however, the domains of percep-
tion and action are arguably dominated by the neurosciences. These retain the infor-
mation processing metaphor of cognitivism (at least superficially) but are different 
enough to be considered a movement on its own. Thus, there is a new and very power-
ful player on the scene and proponents of the ecological approach should determine 
their stance. It would be easy for a cognitive neuroscientist to appropriate the word 
affordance  but miss  its substance by  simply  talking  about  “action  representations” 
stored in some cortical area. Although more thoughtful attempts to develop an ecolog-
ically-motivated neuroscience do exist (see for example Cisek & Kalaska 2010), it is yet 
to be seen if such attempts have any prospects. 
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